The Field of Struggle, the Office, and the Flat: Protest and Aspiration in a Mumbai Slum

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This essay recounts a struggle over the demolition of Golibar, a slum in Mumbai. Such struggles are not uncommon in contemporary India. Urban space is being reorganized across the country, both to meet the needs of economic growth and to take advantage of rapidly growing real estate values. The struggle in Golibar situates global capital and state actors in opposition to slum dwellers who occupy land that has suddenly become extremely valuable. The Slum Rehabilitation Act of the state of Maharashtra provides Mumbaikars with better tools than other Indian slum dwellers have to make their voices heard in urban redevelopment. In contrast, for example, Delhi slum dwellers are often simply evicted violently. But the case is not simply interesting as an example of such struggles. Instead, we are interested in the case because it represents a challenge to the way we think about cities and the struggles that take place in them. Today urbanists think about cities not as integrated wholes but as agglomerations of balkanized communities, economies, and ways of life. Among these, the poor are often thought to be characterized by narrow materialistic concerns with few aspirations for the city as a whole.

The case of Golibar challenges this thinking and suggests that slum dwellers are potential agents for realizing a universalist, liberal, and egalitarian city, an ethos that rests on an aspiration for inclusion in the Global City, not simple economic well-being. It is often assumed that the expanding middle and professional classes will be the agents for realizing such an integrative and cosmopolit-
tan urbanism. However, in Mumbai, civil society organizations representing the expanding middle and professional classes are engaged mostly in a cultural war to define civility in ways that marginalize the practices of the poor. Urban planning firms often propose plans for attractive public spaces that bear a striking resemblance to Central Park in New York on a slow day as if these are the only appropriate uses of public space (of course the costs of constituting such a space in crowded Mumbai are not represented in the proposals or planning documents). Protests against the government have been shifted from the street to a pen next to the Press Club in the name of moderating noise levels near middle-class residences. At the same time, the wealthy are increasingly barricading themselves in luxury concrete towers — turning their backs on the city even as they endeavor to remake it in the image of their enclaves.

In modernist accounts of the city, the city was presented as a whole in which the various components, whether ecological, cultural, or economic, contributed to the creation of a distinctive and holistic entity. Contemporary urban theory, for the most part, disrupts this classic account of the city. Today’s cities are no longer amenable to overarching urbanisms or developmental narratives. Contemporary urban geography is “postmodern” or “medieval” in its fragmented form (Soja 1989; Alsayyad and Roy 2006). Within cities themselves, the varying and layered historical geography of the city reflects different developmental stages and different modes of economic and social integration (Massey 1984; Brenner and Theodore 2002). Alongside this social and geographic fragmentation is a theoretical fragmentation. Because of the variety in urban space, different urban spaces must be analyzed using theories that account for their particularity in order to achieve analytical coherence and credibility. While this approach certainly tells us more about the city than overly general systemic theories like urban ecology do, and also breaks out of the problems that come when analysis proceeds from a tacit developmental narrative, there are costs. Most importantly, theoretical fragmentation tends to overemphasize the distinctiveness of different urban spaces and simultaneously justifies abandoning efforts to integrate spaces and populations into general political and social accommodations that sustain urban social solidarity (Amin 2012).

Mumbai, and more specifically the slum of Golibar, is useful for thinking about these theoretical assumptions. Mumbai, the largest city in India, is overrepresented in literatures on poverty, international development, megacities, globalization, and, perhaps most of all, informal settlements (e.g., Mehrotra 2011). There are two sides to this discourse and, indeed, two sides to the city itself. Mumbai — long a center for trade, manufacturing, and finance — is increasingly a global city. At the
same time, many have noted that becoming a global city does not entail a whole-
sale realization of affluence and modernity. The historical geography of Mumbai
is complicated, and the population is spread across territories with very different
resources and opportunities. The city is home to five of the ten wealthiest Indians;
it is also home to tremendous poverty and deprivation. Pavement dwellers, street
hawkers, and informal slums abound. Practically across the street from Bandra
Kurla Complex, a corporate office space that houses Dow Chemical, Citibank, and
the US consulate, is “Asia’s largest slum,” Dharavi. Because it symbolically rep-
resents urban poverty in the global South, Dharavi attracts so much of the atten-
tion of scholars and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that it has produced
“Dharavi fatigue” among activists and commentators in Mumbai (Patel 2012). As
Arjun Appadurai quipped, in Mumbai one “can have breakfast in Dharavi and
dinner at Indigo,” one of South Mumbai’s flashiest restaurants (Mahadik 2007:
31). This polarization between (and proximity of) wealth and poverty is difficult
to overlook. Nonetheless, the ways slum dwellers are constructing an integrative
urban imaginary — even while elites seek to render them invisible — complicate
this binary. Slums like Dharavi and Golibar, the latter the focus of this essay,
are global slums wherein “the advanced economies and large cultural sectors of
global cities have developed a range of working connections with slum dwellers . . .
[because] parts of the traditional small enterprise sector and of the informal econ-
omy service particular components of the advanced sectors in a city” (Sassen
2011). This social position on the territorial edge of a globalized urbanism is the
site of the construction of new urban subjectivities that are not reducible to com-
munal attachments or socioeconomic position alone (Sassen 1999; cf. Rancière
1989; Calhoun 2012, chap. 5).

One outcome of all of this attention is that Mumbai’s slums are often under-
stood in terms of readily available narratives about the urban poor. Slums are
ghettos that concentrate social dysfunction and criminal behavior; slums repres-
sent an illegal appropriation of land for personal use; slums are occupied by rural
migrants whose “village” practices — superstition, political clientelism, and sub-
sistence production — maintain backward and antimodern identities and behav-
iors. At a more basic level, urban modernity represents “civilization” in Western
discourse in opposition to “nature” (Gandy 2003; Kaika 2005). In this regard,
slum living prevents people from constituting themselves as individuals free to
develop aspirations and identities that go much beyond simple biological reproduc-
tion. Bourgeois individualism can be said to depend on confining bodily necessi-
ties to specially demarcated private spaces separated from spaces of sociability,
yet slum dwellers are rarely able to separate the biological and the individual in the
spaces they occupy. Slum society, it is assumed, does not incubate a civil society beyond the development NGOs that regularly take up residence in them. Even if “global slums” incubate new political subjectivities, the assumption is often that these don’t reach far beyond the imperatives of survival or populist politics. Slum dwellers represent the continuing presence of an uncivilized “nature” in the global city, one that is not capable of reasoned deliberation or liberal political subjectivities. These narratives sustain the territorial stigmatization of slums and slum dwellers, such that in some Indian cities the mere existence of a slum has been legally constituted as a “nuisance” that is subject to removal irrespective of demonstrated harmful effects (Ghertner 2008).

At the same time, another prominent discourse inverts this stigmatization. Mumbai’s slums do not actually look like the ghettos or banlieues of the West. Walking through them at night, one does not worry about personal safety since the streets are often filled with people of all ages. The slums sustain retailers, manufacturers, temples, mosques, and schools. There is indeed much to celebrate about many of Mumbai’s slums. Above all, the fact that they seem to work so well even though they are created and sustained mostly through the autonomous activity of the poor has caused them to be celebrated as “Wikicities,” to borrow from an urban planning firm headquartered in Mumbai (Srivastava and Echanove 2009). Slums incubate the creativity and entrepreneurship of the poor, practices that sustain a discourse of “human potential urbanism.” In light of such celebratory perspectives, the political action of slum dwellers does not appear as backward or communal; rather, slum dwellers’ defense of their authentic and autopoietic communities is entirely rational. The slum, therefore, sustains an alternative way of life that potentially produces mobilizations to defend it against the intrusions of the state and the market.

Critics of this all-too-easy romanticization note that the isolation of the poor sustains the stigmatization of impoverished spaces and their populations, justifying disciplinary strategies of governance instead of efforts to secure their social welfare (Wacquant 2008; Amin 2012). At the same time, the struggles of the urban poor are often assumed to be in pursuit of their distinctive values rather than waged in the name of integration into the city as a whole. Theories of urban protest often see contention as resistance to the disruptions of community caused by the “restless flow of capital” (Harvey 1989: 238). In a related but distinct argument, Partha Chatterjee argues that the politics of the poor in India is an expression not of civil society but of “political society.” In political society, government accommodates the moral criticisms of the marginalized through localized agreements that provide resources rather than through the passage of universal legisla-
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In contrast, the “normative values of modernity” are only possible among the cultural and economic elite in a city like Mumbai (Chatterjee 2004: 41). While they have many differences, all of these theories situate the poor as active agents, but as particularistic ones, limited by their social and geographic positions in the city. Universality is a characteristic of either capitalist urbanization or a transnational cultural and economic elite. The idea that we can learn much about the possibilities of the city from slum dwellers is not widespread. Other accounts of similar struggles are only marginally concerned with the aspirations of the poor themselves and instead focus on either the organizational capacity of the poor or emerging forms of more inclusive governance (Appadurai 2002; Roy 2009; Weinstein 2009).

To recover the possibilities contained in these struggles, we focus on slum dwellers in Golibar. We want to show how urban institutions combine with the space of the slum to produce a distinctively urban subjectivity. This subjectivity is not particularistic but universal, inclusive, and reflects a faith in liberal institutions such as equality before the law. Moreover, this is not merely a derivative subjectivity, appropriated from the powerful. Most other Mumbaikars have abandoned this faith, and, indeed, the subjectivity incubated in Golibar operates as critique as well as aspiration when the state is becoming less coherent and the rule of law is weakening. Of course, the circumstances of the slum do not produce infinite possibilities and must not be romanticized, but reconstructing the struggle over Golibar supports our argument that the slum is a space that can yield a more expansive political subjectivity than the literature assumes. The built environment of the slum, we argue, can provide an “infrastructure” of urban citizenship that imagines a more inclusive and cosmopolitan city. By examining the spaces that slum residents use and tracing their connections to urban institutions and the public sphere, we want to reenchant the city as a space of political possibility that can sustain an inclusive and tolerant urban imaginary — in direct contrast with the way these struggles are usually presented (Sassen 1999; Taylor 2002; Simone 2009).

To reconstruct the subjectivity of Mumbai’s slum dwellers we focus on three spaces within the slum. These spaces have material characteristics that shape the way they are used. However, they are also canvases for aspirations and tools that slum dwellers use to transform themselves from inert object — the poor, the masses — into creative political actors. Two of these spaces are not usually available to slum dwellers but, ironically, were created by housing demolitions. This spatially grounded analysis enables us to capture the possibilities of the slum without romanticizing it and without succumbing to the assumption that need must trump aspiration in the politics of the poor.
We start with a location that seems unremarkable, a space that Golibar residents call the “Field of Struggle.” It was the site of a showdown between the slum dwellers and bulldozers sent to demolish the shanties of Golibar. Focusing on this space reveals how contemporary accounts of struggles over urban space are constructed and, indeed, how Golibar residents make use of them to make claims in the public sphere. At the same time, this space is only one among several in sustaining the aspirations of Golibar residents. Another important space is the “Office” of the Ganesh Krupa Society, one of many housing societies in the slum. The Office demonstrates how Golibar residents are sophisticated citizens who skillfully navigate the Byzantine institutions of the city to realize their goals. Finally, we turn to the Flat. The Flat is a spatial object of aspiration that illuminates much about the sort of urbanism Golibar residents hope to create. Working from these spaces, we hope to trace out the connections between slum dwellers and the various discursive, experiential, and institutional materials they use to constitute a subjectivity more expansive than the slum itself.

The Field of Struggle

In Hindi, golibar means “firing range.” A vast swathe of Golibar’s 140 acres is owned by the Indian Defense Forces, which, until the early 1950s, conducted rifle drills here. Because it lies between the tracks of the city’s Western Railway, used by more than 3 million commuters daily, and the Western Express Highway, the
main vehicular access to Mumbai’s airport and far beyond, Golibar is a blind spot that middle-class Mumbai never sees. It is also a real estate developer’s dream. The slum lies across the tracks from the very desirable neighborhood of Khar, home to film stars, hip Mediterranean restaurants, and a lively bar scene. Three-bedroom flats here sell for approximately $400,000. The informal settlements of Golibar are to be redeveloped under the Slum Rehabilitation Scheme formulated in 1997 by the government of the state of Maharashtra, of which Mumbai (formerly Bombay) is the capital. Golibar is the largest project under the scheme.

According to the 2001 census, Golibar is home to approximately twenty-six thousand people. Starting in the late 1960s, it was settled primarily by people from rural Maharashtra and the northern Indian states of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, though as in any Mumbai slum people from other parts of the country found their way to Golibar too. Several families obtained identity cards, known as photo passes, after the slum census of 1976. From then on, they began to pay compensation for the services they received. Golibar was officially declared a slum in 1995, setting the stage for redevelopment under the provisions of the Slum Rehabilitation Act of 1995.

On November 24, 2010, a demolition team massed on a bumpy piece of cleared ground in the center of Golibar. They were accompanied by a team of police personnel, stout batons in hand. The empty lot — which, by the end of the day, would be rechristened Sangharsh Maidan, or the Field of Struggle — had until recently been occupied by a slum settlement within Golibar called Milan Society. Its residents had moved away after accepting an offer by a developer called Shivalik Ventures, but work on their new homes is nowhere near getting started. A wall of blue metal sheets about fifteen feet high lines one side of the field and blocks it off from passersby on the street. The boundaries are marked on the east by the shells of a demolished cluster of huts and to the south by a group of intact homes.

The field is a rare stretch of open space in a dense neighborhood crowded with shanties, and thus it provided a convenient staging ground for the police vans and wrecking crews attempting to make their way into the area to secure yet another site for Shivalik. But they didn’t get very far. Blocking their entry to the settlement were scores of vociferous slum residents who were determined to stay put in the homes in which many of them had lived all their lives.

1. In 1976 a slum census was conducted, and families were given photo passes. These established that they lived in a particular shanty but did not give them title to it. The government appointed an official known as the controller of slums to ensure that the squatters paid their compensation fee. The compensation fee included service charges, compensation for occupying land, and nominal taxes, with different rates for residential, commercial, and industrial uses.
“We are the owners of this house,” they chanted. “It isn’t yours, it isn’t your father’s.” Another slogan went up in rhyming Hindi: “The word is out in every little lane: Shivalik is a thief.” As their neighbors stopped the police from entering their slum cluster, a few men walked into the field, where they confronted a group of housing board officials. “When we came to see you in your office, you had no time to listen to us,” they said angrily. “How come you’ve got so much now?”

On the border of the field, Prerna Gaekwad, a schoolteacher, and her neighbor Sudesh Paware tried to negotiate with government officials. They asserted that the police had refused to proceed in cases of fraud filed against the developer and asked why they were acting so aggressively against slum dwellers. They had already broken down the homes of seventy-five hundred people all around them but hadn’t built new houses for them, the residents of the slum asserted. Why didn’t they rehouse them before breaking down the slum residents’ homes? The officials of the state housing board had sold them out, they said.

The officials pleaded with the slum dwellers to let them put up the appearance of doing their jobs. Let them demolish only two homes and then they’ll go, they said. But Gaekwad and her neighbors were adamant. If they let them demolish two homes now, they reasoned, what was to stop them from returning to pull down more homes later? After a standoff lasting several hours, the wreckers backed off by 5:30 p.m. Cheers went up as the police vans drove away.

Significantly, in a city in which low-level politicians are quick to seek out aggrieved people in an attempt to demonstrate patronage and build influence, no representatives of political parties came forward to help Gaekwad and her neighbors. Gaekwad’s analysis is clear: “They all probably support Shivalik.”

Two months later, on January 20, 2011, the wrecking crews returned. As the bulldozers gathered in the Field of Struggle, residents of Golibar congregated on the periphery. Waving their clenched fists in the air, they sang “We Shall Overcome” in Hindi. They were galvanized by the presence of the veteran activist Medha Patkar (2011), a fiery leader of the National Alliance of People’s Movements (NAPM), which had been helping organize the agitation. A round of slogan shouting followed. “We won’t leave,” they chanted. “We’ll make the builder leave.”

When the police finally marched up to the settlement, the women of Golibar, both sari-clad Hindus and burqa-clad Muslims, formed a phalanx around the entrance of their settlement. The policemen used their batons to attempt to break through the human shield, but the women refused to yield. Amid the melee, one young man waved the Indian tricolor, as if to reinforce the claim that their resistance was an act of patriotism. The police had to change tactics and call in the
groups of policewomen waiting behind them. The women didn’t give up easily. They sprawled on the ground, and it often took eight policewomen to drag each protestors away into the vans parked on the Field of Struggle. Police slapped the faces or pulled the hair of women who were especially energetic in resisting.

Twenty homes were demolished that day, and forty-eight people were detained for the day, among them Patkar and Gaekwad, who returned from the police station bruised but completely energized. Six days later, on January 26, 2011, more than three hundred people from across Mumbai whose slum clusters were also under threat of demolition gathered in the Field of Struggle to celebrate India’s Republic Day, a national holiday that marks the formal adoption of the country’s constitution in 1950. This was not the time to listen passively, Patkar urged the crowd. It was time to raise their voices so that their rulers could hear their demands. They needed to be able to hear the voices of people in the detention cells of police stations, from their hutments, and from the Field of Struggle.

For a slum, Golibar is a well-functioning community. It is bisected by a lane lined with shops selling food, cloth, electronics, and even new housing in the city’s suburbs. The commercial lane is active well into the night and accommodates activities as diverse as children playing, water deliveries, and impromptu deliberations over the state of the slum. It is home to temples and mosques. Most Golibar residents are working-class: teachers in municipal schools, government clerks, street vendors, electricians, plumbers, or shopkeepers. Most live in one- or two-story brick and cement structures. Residents have electricity connections and regular access to water and use common toilets.

Golibar seems to be a place worth fighting for, especially for people who have been living there much of their lives. “We will win this struggle,” Gaekwad said. “After all, without us, there’s no government. We’ve been paying taxes on this land since 1974. That gives us the right to stay here. No one was involved with activism before. . . . We learned that you first need to know the facts. Only then can you speak with conviction.”

The slum dwellers mobilized on the Field of Struggle to defend their homes, but defend them from what exactly? Developers see Golibar as a gold mine of opportunity, which plays into the larger project of many politicians, corporate leaders, and elite citizens’ groups to transform Mumbai into a global city. Golibar’s redevelopment potential is so high because of its location: wedged between two of the city’s transport arteries, the airport, and a fashionable neighborhood, all within a quick train ride to the central business district in South Mumbai. While ostensibly preserving the rights of slum dwellers, the Slum Rehabilitation Act is primarily designed to open up slums like Golibar for redevelopment. As in many other parts
of the world, accomplishing the feat of urban redevelopment requires aligning elected leaders, bureaucrats, private capital, NGOs, and even organized crime syndicates in support of the project (Weinstein and Ren 2009). Shivalik benefited from this type of support. The incentive for most of these actors is making money, not rehabilitating slum dwellers. The residents of Golibar felt vulnerable to being exploited in the process.

This localized drive for profits is nested within a broader effort to transform Mumbai into a world-class city, a process that entails making the city attractive not just to residents and entrepreneurs but to foreign investors, who have replaced the state as the primary driver of “development” (Nayar and Bombay First 2003). And, indeed, Shivalik is an expression of these interests. Shivalik has situated itself as the developer of all of Golibar. In doing so, it has drawn the attention and investment of a host of actors that link Golibar not only to local but also to national and international interests. The redevelopment of Golibar is to be done not just by Shivalik but also by its partners in the project, including Unitech, a New Delhi–based, publicly traded developer of luxury resorts and luxury developments across India. Unitech, in turn, is a favorite of foreign investors, including Western mutual funds and, until the firm’s collapse, Lehman Brothers (Nandy 2008).

With the battle reaching a peak in May 2011, Patkar staged a hunger strike in Golibar. Having some sense of the configuration of forces arrayed to transform Golibar, slum dwellers sought out their own allies. Perhaps tellingly, they allied not with established local slum dweller advocates but with a newer organization, an affiliate of NAPM. NAPM is a nationwide umbrella organization for activist groups with interests ranging from safeguarding fishermen’s rights to opposing new nuclear power plants to questioning large-scale land acquisitions for special economic zones. As such, NAPM — an organization whose symbol, the clenched fist, signals popular solidarity and a willingness to fight — is familiar with battling the multinational forces arrayed against Golibar in addition to local bureaucrats and developers. Its most prominent figure is the white-haired Patkar, best known for her work with tribal residents of the Narmada Valley who were to be displaced by a massive dam project.

Patkar started her fast on May 20, the day after the bulldozers returned and twelve Ganesh Krupa residents had been arrested for resisting eviction. For nine days, national TV crews crowded Golibar’s narrow main street as the Gandhian activist stopped eating. Sympathizers from across the city — trade union members, residents of other slum pockets, a smattering of students — gathered to show
their support. Patkar’s hunger strike brought Golibar to national attention. It made the prime-time news on several channels and found prominent mention in most newspapers.

It is easy to see this Gandhian protest as an example of what Chatterjee would call “political society.” The hunger strike can be used just as easily to shame a government into making local concessions as it can be to win emancipation from imperial rule. States, uncomfortable with such calls for social justice, are often interested in negotiating local solutions that facilitate governance but that don’t necessarily alter the institutions that produced the problem in the first place. By the sixth day of the strike, as Patkar was visibly weakening, a huddle of government officials came by to negotiate. It took three more days to hammer out the fine print.

Figure 2  NAPM’s symbol, the clenched fist, is stenciled on walls throughout Golibar. Photo by Cassim Shepard
On May 28, nine days after she had started her fast, Patkar ate her first meal after the chief minister of Maharashtra agreed to set up two committees, one to investigate the contentious 3K clause of the Slum Rehabilitation Act of 1995, under which Shivalik had been granted the project, and another committee to investigate the irregularities at various sites in Golibar. With no mechanism available for slum dwellers to hold the chief minister accountable, the government retracted its promise one month later. Struggles over demolitions have continued in Golibar. On some occasions the demolition crews are resisted, and on others they manage to knock some houses down. Despite little response from elected

2. Shivalik Ventures had been authorized in August 2008 to develop the entire swathe of Golibar when the state government invoked a little-known clause of the Maharashtra Slum Areas (Improvement, Clearance and Redevelopment) Act of 1971. Chapter 1A, Section 3K of the act permits the state government to issue the Slum Rehabilitation Authority policy directions “it may think necessary or expedient for carrying out the purposes of the act” and the authority is “bound to carry out and follow these directions” (accessed at housing.maharashtra.gov.in/Sitemap/housing/pdf/actsrules/Maharashtra_Slum_Areas_Improvement_Clearance.pdf).
officials or the Slum Redevelopment Authority but with the help of documentar-
ians and a sympathetic local television station, slum dwellers have taken their call
for justice to the public.

As an avatar of this conflict, Gaekwad celebrates the collective defiance of
Golibar, in particular the engagement of children, who are presumably sensitive
to the core moral issues at stake. In this fight, slum residents receive help from
important social justice NGOs, such as NAPM, which magnifies the voices of
slum residents in the public sphere, especially since a Gandhian hunger strike
by a well-known, professional activist helps ensure that the government comes
to the table. This account is uplifting but conventional. It situates slum residents
as committed but politically unsophisticated, in need of NAPM’s help. There is
much more — in spatial, social, and practical terms — to this story. Reconstructing
an account of the urban imaginary of the poor on the basis of the politics in the
Field of Struggle would be misleading. It is necessary to look at the other spaces
of the slum to properly understand the action in those spaces as well as to recon-
struct the politics of Golibar residents. If
we don’t, it is too easy to fall into the trap
of characterizing the struggle as one of
particularistic political society or some
other reductionist explanation of politi-
cal action.

The Office

Exclusively focusing on the Field of
Struggle as the central space of the
conflict between Shivalik and the resi-
dents of Golibar does not fully account
for how the practices employed in this
struggle instantiate an integrative urban
imaginary. While the slum residents’ use
of the Field of Struggle to resist a power-
ful, police-backed developer is instruc-
tive, investigating that space alone gives
the appearance of a relatively conventional story of slum residents attempting to
defend their community against the depredations of capital or of the distinctive
political culture of the poor. To put the Field of Struggle in proper perspective, we
turn to another space that is even more important in enabling the Ganesh Krupa

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Residents refer to this second space as the “Office.” The moniker “office” simultaneously misleads — its physical reality is a tarp thrown over some poles with a few benches and a table underneath — and illuminates both the nature of the conflict and the citizenship practices Ganesh Krupa performs. In treating the Office as a space that enables Golibar residents to act as citizens of the city, we begin to move away from conventional narratives about such struggles.

To understand the Office, it is first necessary to understand whose office it is. The vanguard of the protest against Shivalik in Golibar is the Ganesh Krupa Society, which represents a specific tract within Golibar. Forming the organization was a necessary step to make a deal with a developer under the Slum Rehabilitation Scheme. Thus the Ganesh Krupa Society is not an organization constituted to realize the values of a solidaristic community. Instead, it was constituted by a law for the express purpose of facilitating the governance of slum redevelopment (Roy 2009). The law itself was instrumental in constituting the agent that was holding it accountable in Golibar; it was not some autonomous or authentic expression of slum-dweller politics. Importantly, however, in doing so the state constituted an actor that took seriously its claims to legitimacy: accountability to the people, the rule of law, equality before the law. The question that is implied in the practices of the Office is whether government in Mumbai is legitimate on its own terms.

While Gaekwad is the personification of the politics of the Field of Struggle, a longtime Golibar resident named Aba Tandel personifies the practices that take shape in the Office. Tandel’s weapon of choice in the struggle over Golibar is the Right to Information (RTI) petition, which gives citizens access to state documents. Tandel filed his first RTI petition in 2006, when his slum tract, Sambhaji Society, came up for redevelopment. Since then, he has filed more than 250 RTI petitions to help his neighbors acquire copies of survey maps and documents from the collector, the municipal corporation, the urban development ministry, and the city survey department. Tandel learned to file the petitions after obtaining a booklet issued by the state government’s information officer after the RTI Act was passed in 2005. But he soon realized that officials did their best to stall him, so over the years, he’s perfected the art of ferreting out the information he requires. Questions, he realized, had to be posed in a specific way, leaving no room for ambiguity. If you’re going after really sensitive information, it makes sense to do so in two or three stages, like steadily climbing a ladder, he said, so that you don’t give the whole game away in one shot. Tandel has used the RTI Act to point out several contradictions in Shivalik’s proposal and forgeries in the consent letter for
Golibar. Patient navigation of bureaucratic and legal rules, mastering paperwork, and building legal arguments characterize the political practice of the Office.

The tent was erected in May 2011 on a plot of land cleared by the demolition of several homes. Like the Field of Struggle, Golibar residents have opportunistically seized the spaces temporarily opened up by redevelopment to construct an infrastructure of slum-dweller politics. The use made of these spaces reveals much about the people using them. The Office is fifty yards off the main road and is surrounded mostly by slum dwellers’ housing. It feels like a courtyard that is immediately accessible from the surrounding homes while at the same time functioning as a sort of public square. The one solid wall of the Office is the side of a home previously hidden by other, now-demolished structures. The wall is sparsely decorated with the charter of the Ganesh Krupa Society and a stencil of the clenched fist of NAPM (which appears on walls throughout the area). Indeed, the demolitions seem to hang over the courtyard in a way that gives purpose to the activities in the Office. While there are many intact and occupied structures surrounding the courtyard — where neighbors engage in routine household activities, children appear and then disappear just as quickly, and TVS flicker in windows — there are also the remnants of half-finished demolitions. Knocked-down walls reveal the floor tiles of what were once bathrooms and kitchens, and the nooks created by incomplete demolitions are used to hang laundry. The debris, it seems, serves as a motivational reminder to those who remain that their effort to create a home in Golibar would amount to nothing if they lost the battle.

The Office itself is not organized for the public performance of slum-dweller outrage. The tarp draped over wooden poles shelters some makeshift wooden benches and an old desk. It’s used as a meeting room for small conferences with visitors, as a community center for larger conclaves (the audience sits on brown canvas sheets laid out on the ground), or as a theater for children to stage plays (sometimes about the demolitions they’ve experienced). It is where the behind-the-scenes work of slum-dweller protest takes place.

Indeed, the work in the Office is the core of the protest. Rather than a simple morally grounded expression of outrage at the assault on their community, slum-dweller strategy centers on holding the Slum Redevelopment Authority accountable to its own regulations and guidelines. Established by the Slum Rehabilitation Act of 1995, the authority is responsible for the implementation of the act. The act itself favors slum residents in many ways. While slum dwellers with long tenure, such as those in Golibar, usually take the view that their homes have been “regularized” through the payment of taxes and fees, securing permission to build,
and various other interactions with government entities that implicitly recognize their legitimacy, Golibar is still an informal settlement that exists because people appropriated land that they did not have title to. Its informality is perhaps belied by the fact that slum-dweller “shanties” in Golibar actually look permanent. They are constructed mostly with brick and concrete, and they have been improved in a variety of ways including tiling on walls and floors and the installation of windows and doors with locks. Nonetheless, it seems inevitable that the combination of growing real estate values, Golibar’s location, and the aspirations of the city’s elite to become a world city would inevitably combine to open the slum to redevelopment. The Slum Rehabilitation Act facilitates this process.

The act functions primarily to incentivize private developers to produce new housing for slum dwellers by providing them the opportunity either to develop slum land more intensively than would otherwise be possible or to develop land in other parts of the city. Essentially, developers are freed from normal regulations or offered “transfer of development rights” that function as securities backed by the right to intensively develop urban land. While the act provides many opportunities for private developers, it also places many requirements on their treatment of slum dwellers. Most importantly, the developer must provide housing in situ. To secure land for market-rate development on the site, the in situ requirement leads the developer to rehouse slum dwellers in multifamily buildings that are usually seven to ten stories tall. The flats provided must be a minimum of 225 square feet and have indoor plumbing. The flats are provided free of charge, and the developer must pay the building maintenance fees for ten years, after which time the resident pays. The developer also must provide temporary housing — called transit housing — for slum dwellers until they can be placed in their new flat. Finally, and perhaps most onerously for the developer, plans must be approved by 70 percent of the residents of the slum tracts that are to be redeveloped. Effectively, the law regularizes slum dwellers — at least those who can demonstrate residence in the slum prior to 1995 — but only as a way to ensure that redevelopment can proceed in a way that respects slum dwellers’ need for shelter. Nonetheless, using Susan Fainstein’s (2010) criteria of justice, equality, and inclusion, the law compares favorably to those in other Indian states and many Western nations.

The conflicts in the Field of Struggle must be understood as merely one component of a broader campaign to realize slum-dweller rights in the context of the Slum Rehabilitation Act. The activities in the Office indicate that the protestors’ primary dispute is with illegalities in the implementation of the act and the lack of enforcement by the Slum Redevelopment Authority, which oversees the process. Indeed, there were many irregularities.
When the Slum Redevelopment Scheme was announced in 1991, Golibar’s residents began to organize themselves into housing cooperative societies to take advantage of the plan. By the mid-1990s, forty-six societies had been formed. Ganesh Krupa, a collection of 323 homes, was among them. Of the 323 families in Ganesh Krupa, 283 were declared eligible; that is, they could demonstrate residence before the cutoff date of 1995. In March 2003, an official survey found that 199 of the 283 families of Ganesh Krupa had given their consent for the scheme — which made up the mandatory 70 percent. Their right to the land was clear: in 2003 the state government indicated in a letter that it had acquired the land and that the plot could be transferred to the Ganesh Krupa Cooperative Society. In January that year, the residents paid property tax of Rs 504,920 and were ceded legal ownership of the land.

In April 2003, Ganesh Krupa signed a deal with a firm named Madhu Constructions, and little changed until some surveyors appeared in 2009, saying that they represented Shivalik Ventures. Many Ganesh Krupa residents, who until that moment had never heard of Shivalik, were concerned. They maintained that...
since they had signed a deal with Madhu Constructions, not with Shivalik, they were under no obligation to follow its instructions. Assisted by neighbors from surrounding slum pockets and by representatives of NAPM, which had already started working in Ambewadi, a cluster of shanties across the street, the residents of Ganesh Krupa began to take stock of the situation — and to figure out how to get what they wanted.

For Gaekwad, this entailed far more than learning to lead protests and the most effective strategies for beating back demolition crews. Over the next few months, the schoolteacher would find herself becoming a student in a variety of subjects: the Slum Rehabilitation Act of 1995, the Criminal Procedure Code, the RTI Act, the hierarchies of the Collectorate — the office that administers land records in Mumbai — and the art of making concise media statements.

The first learning experience came in January 2010, when 178 residents of Ganesh Krupa were sent a demolition notice from Shivalik. The residents countered this by filing an RTI petition with the Registrar of Cooperatives demanding to know how Shivalik had come to replace Madhu Constructions in the deal. The reply revealed that Shivalik had signed a deal with Madhu in 2008 to execute the project as a joint venture. But when Gaekwad and her neighbors studied the agreement letter that Shivalik had submitted to the authorities, they realized that the documentation of Ganesh Krupa’s consent to this arrangement had been forged. “People who didn’t speak English had signed in English, [and] the signatures of people who weren’t in town had been shown,” said Gaekwad. Most tellingly, the consent list had the signature of Sulochna Pawar, who had died four years before she supposedly signed her name at the general body meeting. Gaekwad explained that they then “filed a forgery complaint with the police.” Upon examining the text of the Slum Rehabilitation Act, Ganesh Krupa residents were happy to learn that any fraudulently derived consent rendered a letter of intent void. Unfortunately, the Slum Redevelopment Authority chose to overlook the violation. The police, for their part, refused to investigate the case, and ultimately a court had to order them to do so. The investigation has still not been concluded despite the presence of what the Ganesh Krupa Society says is prima facie evidence of fraud (Khar East Andolan 2012).

The residents also filed a civil case against Shivalik, claiming that they had not given their consent for the project, that they would be unable to afford the maintenance costs of tenements in the fifteen-story building that Shivalik planned (the taller the building, the higher the maintenance costs), and that they had doubts about the viability of the transit accommodation they were being offered. Because
Shivalik illegally built much of its transit housing on land owned by the Indian Air Force (a fact that a Ganesh Krupa RTI petition brought to light), residents worried that the transit housing would be torn down at the very moment they would need it.

The conflict in Golibar is as much about the successful navigation of the bureaucracy of the Indian state as it is about protest tactics. Success in this struggle depends upon utilizing the few levers slum dwellers have to move the government bureaucracies. One such lever is the RTI petition mobilized by Tandel. Under the provisions of the RTI Act, passed in 2005, any Indian citizen may request information from a public authority using a specified form. The state entity is required to reply within thirty days. Across Mumbai, slum dwellers have been using the RTI Act to obtain data about the projects and developers that threaten to displace them. The petition that was most damaging to Shivalik was the one that revealed that 12.2 acres of land slated for transit housing were actually owned by the Indian Air Force. The defense services have since taken Shivalik to court. The RTI petitions have served to arm Ganesh Krupa with the weapons necessary to pursue legal challenges against Shivalik as well as make its case in public. Its critique is not moral; it is legal. Indeed, Ganesh Krupa has set up a website that diligently lays out timelines and legal documents that demonstrate Shivalik’s illegality. The assumption is that this material and not poignant pictures of children supporting a protest is more important for arbitrating the issue.

The second lever is electoral politics. Unlike in the United States, the poor vote in India and political parties usually work to maintain their populist credentials. Indeed, voter participation might explain why the Slum Rehabilitation Act makes the provisions it does for slum dwellers. Improvements in slums, such as the provision of water taps or communal toilets, are often provided by politicians to boost their popularity. However, in this case the politicians were not useful, and, indeed, Mumbaikars often assume that politicians have their own deals with developers (Gaekwad 2012; Tandel 2012).

The third lever is the courts, and, indeed, the outcome of the struggle in Golibar ultimately was a judicial decision, not a political one. The court case of greatest significance concerned the validity of demolitions by Shivalik given the dubious basis of its claim to have secured the consent of the Ganesh Krupa Society. Arguing that the residents had a legitimate case but that rectifying the fraud would serve no useful purpose, on December 23, 2010, the High Court ordered the eviction of “nonconsenting” residents, after which the residents of Golibar had to face down demolition efforts on the Field of Struggle. In doing so, they received considerable support, not least because of outrage caused by the failure of state
institutions to abide by their own rules and standards of conduct. The Slum Redevelopment Authority, which exists ostensibly to protect slum dwellers, overlooked its own rules, and the High Court overlooked a legal finding, in allowing the developer to proceed with demolitions.

The efforts of Ganesh Krupa ultimately failed in the face of collapsing state institutions. Developers in Mumbai are able to build without demonstrating, what Americans would call, “site control,” and the facts on the ground are mostly respected by the institutions that exist to ensure the legality of slum redevelopments: the Slum Redevelopment Authority and the courts. State institutions themselves operate at cross-purposes and ignore not only the law but their own regulations. As for development, the rule of law does not prevail in Mumbai. And, indeed, this was the greatest miscalculation of the Ganesh Krupa Society. Its members assumed that things like laws and regulations mattered and that if they could mobilize them against Shivalik, they would win. Consequently, from their base in the Office they invested countless hours mastering bureaucratic systems in the manner Tandel did with the RTI. As a consequence, Gaekwad says, “Now people whose homes are in danger in other parts of the city come to us for advice. . . . We tell them not to put their names to any documents they haven’t read.” However, what is relevant here is not that they lost. After all, this essay is not about social movement outcomes. What is relevant is the aspirations, values, and ideals evident in their practice. Far from acting in defense of the particularistic values and solidarities of “community,” Ganesh Krupa acted on the basis of a faith in the rule of law and the blindness of the law in a democratic society to the social standing of the parties concerned. Ganesh Krupa acted out of faith in liberal institutions rather than out of the desire to have its particularistic moral critiques or narrow socioeconomic interests recognized. In doing so, its members acted as prototypical bourgeois citizens of the Modernist City. In resisting the allure of the particularistic claim, this mode of action advances an integrative urban imaginary in which institutions, laws, and the built environment present opportunities for, and infrastructures of, citizenship.

The Flat

In Mumbai, the premium on space (intensified by Mumbai’s peninsular and longitudinal physical geography) promotes the perceived necessity to replace low-rise shanties with flat towers to free up land for more development. Indeed, this idea is built into the Slum Rehabilitation Act, which utilizes development rights as the “payment” to developers for rehousing slum dwellers. This logic differs greatly
from current thinking in the United States, for instance, where federal incentives are encouraging local governments to replace the large flat blocks built for the poor and working classes in the 1950s and 1960s with low-rise, scattered-site, and mixed-income developments. Justifications for this policy shift include the negative effects of concentrated poverty and growing real estate values. Thus, to an American eye, Mumbai’s ranks of shoddy flat towers, separated by trash piles and disconnected from the main economic activity of the city, appear as a monumental policy mistake. This perception makes it easy to romanticize the slums that, whatever their shortcomings, appear to be much healthier communities than the ghettos and banlieues of the West. From this perspective, mobilizations to stop demolitions and defend slums make sense. But that view underplays the complex meanings of flat dwelling in contemporary Mumbai. Flats signal respectability, urbanity, and privacy. At the same time, Mumbaikars are aware that moving into a new flat does not automatically produce this transformation — a fact that opens the door to competing meanings and discourses that are rooted in different experiences and social circumstances.

Figure 6 On Golibar’s main street, developers and real estate agents offer flats in distant Virar, more than two hours’ drive north. Photo by Cassim Shepard
The Flat, then, is the third space that underpins the political activism of Golibar residents. The Flat is not a spatial “infrastructure” in the same way the Field of Struggle and the Office are. It is not a physical space that is appropriated for slum-dweller protest. Rather, the Flat is the spatial grounding of the aspirations of the slum dwellers. The idea of the Flat links together both the indignities of the slum, even a relatively affluent slum like Golibar, and the possibility of a new mode of living that would enable slum residents to overcome those indignities. Recognizing the Flat as the core aspiration of slum-dweller activism in Golibar suggests an aspiration for an urbanism that is rarely attributed to them.

But the Flat is not perceived as an end in itself. Looking closely at the motivations of the Golibar protesters reveals their nuanced awareness of other communities’ experiences with slum rehabilitation and rehousing projects throughout Mumbai. Two recent examples help explain the skepticism in Golibar about Shivalk’s proposal, despite the widely shared aspiration to flat living.

Mankhurd, in northeastern Mumbai, is among the neighborhoods in the city’s administrative M Ward, which has the lowest human development indicators in the city: 77.5 percent of its population lives in slums (compared to 54 percent for Mumbai overall); average life expectancy is thirty-nine years (compared to a city-wide average of fifty-two years); and the ward’s population density is 66,881 people per square kilometer (compared to 20,898 citywide). M Ward is home to the city’s biggest garbage dump, two petrochemical refineries, and a fertilizer plant. Over the past decade, it has also become home to about 60,000 “project-affected people;” or people relocated to around one hundred buildings, seven to fourteen stories high, after their previous dwellings were demolished in road construction or other infrastructural projects. Also moved here were people who lived on pavements along arterial roads as well as people whose homes were dangerously close to the Harbour Line railway tracks. In June 2011, a team of activists declared that the sixty-five buildings in the Lallubhai Compound area of Mankhurd were no better than “vertical slums”: they noted that the buildings have little light or ventilation, that they violated fire-safety regulations, and that they had erratic water supply.

Residents of Mankhurd, people who had previously been living a precarious existence alongside railroad tracks, have many complaints about their new homes, homes that were provided for free. In interviews, complaints included the distance of Mankhurd from their places of work — Mankhurd is, economically speaking, in the middle of nowhere. For many residents, their wages are too low to allow them to travel to jobs elsewhere. The trash filling up the spaces between buildings does not arouse much ire, but many say that living in shanties was better. In
the shanties, it was easier to accommodate large families; indeed, one oft-noted difference between the shanty and the flat is that the former is a flexible space that can be adapted to meet different needs, while the latter is fixed and seems to require a certain type of family (nuclear), employment (waged), and sociability (taking place outside the home). Along with communities, large families are necessarily broken up in the transition to housing in Mankhurd.

Another common complaint is that the indoor toilets in the flats are actually worse than slum accommodations. Public toilets are better able to accommodate large families, and, more importantly, having an indoor toilet is only an improvement if you have running water. Unfortunately, in Mankhurd and other slum rehabilitation projects running water is only available very intermittently. Slums had more safe space for children, and stealing is a bigger problem in Mankhurd, both problems related to the fact that no one knows one another. Elevators are not maintained, transforming flat buildings into prisons for older residents. Finally, living in the slum was cheaper. Some contest this negative portrayal — notably people who are living with nuclear rather than extended families — by noting that the buildings themselves are safer. Perhaps more importantly, the regularization of their status by being provided with flats to which they have title free of charge (though they pay maintenance fees) is considered an improvement.

Sangharsh Nagar, located in the Chandivali area of northwestern Mumbai, is another slum relocation scheme, designed by the accomplished architect P. K. Das with the express purpose of overcoming some of the problems in Mankhurd. The people of Sangharsh Nagar were relocated from shanties they had built in the Sanjay Gandhi National Park. (Like people who lived in shanties along railroad tracks, the park dwellers could not be rehoused in situ.) Rather than the uninterrupted ranks of housing separated by large, trash-strewn open spaces that prevail in Mankhurd, the buildings in Sangharsh Nagar are organized around courtyards that provide relatively sheltered spaces for children to play and other leisure activities. The lower tier of space in the buildings is reserved for nonresidential activities including the offices of the housing society, a politician’s office, a nursery school, and a small shop selling candy and drinks. The development is designed to allow more light and facilitate more sociability than the buildings of Mankhurd.

And yet the complaints of these relocated slum dwellers are just as vehement as those in Mankhurd. As in Mankhurd, water is rarely available — according to some, water is only available at the taps once per day for about thirty minutes — despite the payment of maintenance fees of around Rs 300 per month. Many feel that more water is actually available but that their current representative to the city legislature, the Brihanmumbai Municipal Corporation (BMC; formerly the Bom-
bay Municipal Corporation), is punishing them for a lack of support. The state representative has tried to help by digging bore wells, but the water quality is poor and the new tanks are located in the courtyards that are supposed to be spaces of leisure. The development is in what was once a quarry, and it is graded poorly. As a result, water that runs off the hill collects in the courtyards and becomes a breeding ground for disease. The buildings are shoddily built; one resident says, “If you hit a nail into the wall, it cracks.” For the forty thousand people living in the development there are no schools, no big hospital, no gate for the compound, and no playground; there is only one underground water tank for every eighteen buildings; and, finally, residents are getting billed for things that they think the developer should be paying for. The problems are great enough that some residents are choosing to return to their shanties in the national park. Another resident of Sangharsh Nagar says: “The SRA [Slum Rehabilitation Authority] doesn’t check the work of the builder. It only exists on paper; it doesn’t do anything in reality.”

Perhaps the greatest indignity is that at the bottom of the hill is a massive city within the city. Downtown Las Vegas seems to have been plunked down on the edge of Mumbai. Several huge luxury flat buildings flanked by indoor malls occupied by American and European retailers dominate the area of Powai, adjacent to Chandivali and Sangharsh Nagar. Ironically enough, this playground for the affluent was built on land originally allocated for a low-income development. (NAPM was central in exposing this scandal, which motivated an ongoing court case.)

Residents of Golibar are aware of these issues. In addition to connections made through family and work, Mumbai’s scattered slums are linked by a number of NGOs engaged in providing social services, advocating for slum dwellers, and conducting research to inform policy. However, despite the problems in many slum redevelopments, the idea of the Flat remains a powerful aspiration. To see how this aspiration functions as a conceptual infrastructure of citizenship — that is, as an organizer and motivator for political practices based on an integrative urban imaginary — we must first break with the idea that slum-dweller activism in Golibar is a defense of the slum community. Of course, real reasons for such a defense are manifest: Golibar is in many ways a much better place to live than Mankhurd; residents have access to water, electricity, employment, transportation, shopping, temples, mosques, graveyards, businesses, and schools. And all of this exists in a space that can be traversed in a fifteen-minute walk. For these reasons, slum redevelopment will not be as traumatic as it was for those who had squatted on the Sanjay Gandhi National Park, for the simple reason that the slum redevelopments in Golibar will be in the same place. Even as the landscape is transformed, many of the faces occupying the new buildings will be the same. Moreover, unlike
the residents of Mankhurd and Sangharsh Nagar, eligible Golibar residents will remain in a relatively central location with easy access to one of the main railways and a highway. But this difference merely muddies the question of the motivation for the protest.

In conversation, Golibar residents insistently communicate both the various injustices that have been perpetrated on them and the admirable solidarity the community has demonstrated in defending itself. The battles with police, Gaekwad’s celebration of the militancy of the children, the self-proclaimed Ganesh Krupa guard who moved his light manufacturing business into Golibar so he could immediately respond to any demolitions, the willingness of the other societies to stand with Ganesh Krupa, all are things that are narrated in the Office with obvious attention to impressing outsiders as well as to meeting the need to renarrate the struggle to one another. The involvement of organizations like NAPM adds to the tendency to romanticize community solidarity in the face of gross injustice.

Yet when residents are pressed to explain what motivates them to engage in this extended and perhaps quixotic struggle, the answer is surprising. Tandel, the expert on RTI petitions, summarizes the difference between perception and reality nicely:

People think that we want to stop the progress of Mumbai. That is not true. We want to ensure that our rights are guaranteed and that the builder doesn’t exploit us. After all, this is our land. Why should we give it up if we aren’t going to get a good deal? People think we are getting free houses. That is not true. We are actually giving up one house in exchange for another — sometimes it’s a smaller house.

A frequent refrain in interviews with members of the Ganesh Krupa Society was that they “want development too.” But the discursive context in Mumbai makes this easy to overlook. Mumbai has developed rapidly over the past twenty years. Infrastructure and institutional reform both lag, but the attractiveness of Mumbai to foreign capital is not lost on anyone in the city. Active projects, supported by organizations like the strategic corporate organization Bombay First, attempt to facilitate Mumbai’s transformation by characterizing development as an unqualified good to be pursued, while those who question it are portrayed as anticivic or backward. This powerful coalition of growth-oriented elites includes real estate developers, newspapers, foreign investors, middle-class activists, politicians, and even gangsters (Logan and Molotch 1987; Weinstein 2009). Moreover, this coalition’s discourse regularly situates slum dwellers as impediments to growth, not necessarily because they contest development, but because many of
the greatest opportunities to reorganize urban space profitably involve slums. In a different register, local elites understand the behavior of the poor of the city as the greatest obstacle to making the city attractive for foreign investment and for a global cosmopolitan cultural and economic elite (including a new generation of wealthy Indians).

In saying that they “want development too,” Golibar residents are not nodding to a dominant discourse, much less performing fealty to it. After all, Golibar residents, or their parents, migrated to the city to improve their economic well-being. While the slum has been effective in facilitating socioeconomic mobility, the associations of slums with poverty, desperation, and a lack of respect for urban civility mean that the idea of residence in a flat signifies something very potent: respectability. This respectability comes in the form of both social status and legal regularization.

Developers understand the striving of slum residents. This is evident in the storefronts they have established on Golibar’s main lane to sell flats on the outskirts of the city. The advertisements promise comfortable living in new buildings that won’t leak in the monsoon. They hold out the promise of greater physical comfort, the most important aspect of which is the promise of a private toilet and bathroom. Even in a relatively well-off slum like Golibar, meeting the needs of the body entails a number of negotiations with one’s neighbors. Privacy is notoriously hard to come by and doing something as mundane as relieving oneself before work can involve waiting in lines or waking up early to beat “rush hour” at the communal toilet. The promise of running water and a private toilet is unrivaled as the most commonly invoked positive aspect of flat living. The possibility of improved status, respectability, or comfort in a flat without running water, however, is limited.

The struggle in Golibar, then, is being waged to ensure that the promise of the flat is actually realized by a developer that honors its promises and the provisions of the law. Ganesh Krupa’s constituents are familiar with the problems in Mankhurd and even in Golibar itself. Their effort is not a defense of the status quo of their community. Rather, it is an elaborate negotiation, designed to ensure that the problems of other developments won’t be their problems. As a negotiation, it is extremely sophisticated. Ganesh Krupa uses diverse communications technologies, NGOs, the courts, organizational skills, and knowledge of relevant government agencies and regulations to achieve its goal. Ganesh Krupa wants to realize the possibilities of living in the city. These possibilities are endangered less by the destruction of the slum than by the bad faith of the developer and the failure of government to enforce its own laws. When pressed on what it wants out of the struggle,
a housing society, Meena Cooperative Society, with mostly Muslim members on
the end of Golibar opposite Ganesh Krupa, takes us to an unremarkable building
that is nonetheless less run down than many slum redevelopment projects. We are
told that inside the water actually runs. Members want a modest flat in a building
that functions. Ismail Ibrahim Patel, of Meena Society, elaborates:

We are all educated people. We have lived here since our childhood. All
around, we can see Mumbai developing — but that development never
seems to benefit us. We want to live in solid buildings too. We want our
children to have gardens to play in and to be able to walk safely in the
street without being knocked over by cars. Our forefathers have built this
city. They were the carpenters and masons who built all the big buildings.
It’s time that we also enjoyed the rewards.

Conclusion

On February 29, 2012, just past 1 p.m., a wrecking crew was once again ready to
march into Ganesh Krupa Society. The workers, carrying crowbars and sledge-
hammers, wore badges identifying them as being “on collector’s duty” and had
on yellow safety helmets.

The workers were preceded by a platoon of policemen and policewomen in
special riot gear: they bore plastic canes and transparent shields, even though
bamboo batons and protective gear are standard issue for the force. Accompany-
ing them was a representative of the collector, the government official in charge
of land tenure in the district. Bringing up the rear was an ambulance, just in case
the people whose homes were slated for demolition put up any especially energetic
resistance, as they had done on previous occasions.

But this time was different. This was the fifth time the wrecking crews had
been at work at Ganesh Krupa Nagar since 2010. The first time the bulldozers
attempted to force their way in, in November 2010, the residents of Ganesh Krupa
Nagar formed a phalanx on the lane leading into their cluster and refused to let
the wreckers pass. Even the police couldn’t tear them away.

However, in the two years on, their resolve had been chipped away a little. Of
the 323 homes that stood in the cluster in 2010, only 184 remained. Some homes
had been demolished; the owners of the others had succumbed to incentives or
couldn’t take the pressure of the uncertainty. A senior police official, G. T. Pad-
wal, used a cordless mike to make an announcement. He asked the residents to
cooperate with the authorities and to leave their homes peacefully. “Please make
your protests in court,” he urged. “We request you to please clear your homes.”
The wreckers had brought along big white tarpaulin sacks, and the residents meekly stuffed their belongings into them. The organizer of the local NAPM affiliate, Simpreet Singh, put a brave face on this denouement, presenting it as part of a game of cat and mouse. Nonetheless, with the courts unwilling to intervene, despite acknowledged misconduct by the developer, and state officials refusing to abide by the agreement they made during Patkar’s hunger strike, the outcome seemed clear.

However, the theoretical significance of the struggle in Golibar does not depend on this outcome. Rather, the significance is what it reveals about the discourses that surround slum dwellers in a globalizing city like Mumbai and, crucially, what these discourses exclude. In this case, Golibar’s story suggests the possibility that the precariat of the modern global city can aspire to an urbanism that is inclusive, egalitarian, mutually beneficial. For developers and their allies, the slum dwellers stand in the way of an urban transformation that, it is claimed, will make Mumbai a twenty-first-century city. Whether or not it does this, the potential profits to be realized have attracted the interest of multinationals and investors as far afield as the United States.

Academic and intellectual observers have mostly abandoned the very idea that a liberal and inclusive urbanism is even possible. Instead, the fragmentary and disconnected nature of the city is emphasized with the result that geographic propinquity corresponds to conceptions of urban citizenship that are radically different. Urbanism in the global era is more than simply “postmodern”; it is ironically “medieval” and narrowly “telescopic” (Soja 1989; Alsayyad and Roy 2006; Amin 2012). Scholars who are interested in the possibilities of the global city note that the new social relations the global city engenders are likely to produce as-yet unimagined identities and discourses, or they mine the everyday interactions of the poor on the street and find their orientation to opportunity to be potentially valuable (Sassen 1999; Gandy 2005; Simone 2009). At the same time, other voices find urban spaces of exclusion to be hopelessly limiting. Slums can sustain communal self-defense and political society but not civil society or a more expansive urbanism (Chatterjee 2004). Of course, these analyses all offer possible interpretations of the struggle in Golibar. The former would point to the opportunism evident when Ganesh Krupa acknowledges that it is negotiating for a better deal. The latter would point to how Ganesh Krupa shows itself to be a form of political society in its interactions with the government and, perhaps more importantly, in its limited efforts to organize the other housing societies of Golibar. But looking at this struggle more expansively forces us to question the limitations of these characterizations.
Addressing this question is complex. It is necessary to confront the literature on politics in the globalizing city that, whether positive or not, has a tendency to see the city producing a hodgepodge of distinct urbanisms for distinct socioeconomic and cultural territories. The scholarly task from the perspective of this postmodern narrative is to find language to describe the particularistic identities and aspirations that are rooted in the varied and unconnected geography of the city. If there continues to be such a thing as urban civil society and a liberal social imaginary that privileges the equality of citizens before the law, a notion of mutual dependence that can underpin a market society and self-government, a civil society and a public sphere, it is assumed to persist only among an economic and cultural elite.

Another complexity is the nature of the struggle in Golibar itself. The Field of Struggle was home to a number of highly visible and dramatic confrontations and protests. These protests captured the attention of documentarians and a television station and became a tempting object for analysts and scholars. The skill of Golibar residents in deploying a repertoire of protest in such a way as to convey the justice of their cause in the public sphere merely adds to the attractiveness of the Field of Struggle, but this unintentional misdirection also masks a more complex and interesting mobilization. Residents of Ganesh Krupa and of Golibar also used other spaces, skills, and aspirations. If we zoom out to consider these various spaces and practices, the nature of the overall action comes into view.

Once we include the Office and the Flat in our consideration, we can see that the three spatial bases of the struggle reveal a more complicated political action underpinned by a social imaginary that is rarely attributed to slum dwellers. Using the space of the Office allows us to see a more prosaic and strategic engagement with the Slum Rehabilitation Authority and the courts. In engaging these state institutions, the residents of Ganesh Krupa display the sort of political skills that are often associated with middle-class activism in Mumbai. Action here depends on the ability to research, build logical arguments, and manipulate the levers of various state institutions. The Office itself has become a space that is premised on a faith in democratic institutions. In the Flat, we find an object of aspiration that contains both all the possibilities of an inclusive and affluent urbanism and the nightmare of a more constrained and externally determined existence.

Focusing on the use residents of Ganesh Krupa make of the spatial morphology of the slum, an aspirational social imaginary comes into view. But it is not radically new. Indeed, in many ways it reflects a traditionally liberal view of the city. The practices and discourses of Golibar residents reveal a faith in the rule of law, the accountability of state institutions to citizens, the effectiveness of citizens organized as a collective agency, and the idea of a social contract. Moreover, these
practices are extended in the aspiration for a flat — a setting where individuality can be distinguished from biology and the private from the public in a way that is hard to sustain in Golibar.

Of course, one possible interpretation of these practices and aspirations is that they are hegemonic and, therefore, predictably appropriated by slum dwellers. However, contemporary Mumbai is no longer a liberal democratic society. State institutions are less invested in the rule of law and do not act with a single interest in mind. Politicians mobilize populist sympathies along particularistic lines and ally with those who want to eliminate slums in the most profitable way even as they court poor voters. Indeed, real estate development in Mumbai is a free-for-all in which developers build profitable structures, often on land they don’t own or have a right to, and hope to work out the details at a later time. In this context, the Slum Rehabilitation Scheme, which on paper is quite accommodating of the rights of slum dwellers, in practice, does little to moderate the drive for profits. Private interests are organized into development partnerships and strategic projects in the name of reshaping Mumbai to be a space that yields profits, while being a home to the specific urbanism of foreign investors and the city’s economic and cultural elite. In this context, slum dwellers are constituted as the problem to be addressed, not by inclusion but by further marginalization. In this struggle over the future of the city, institutions like the rule of law, the equality of all citizens before the law, and the accountability of the state to organized citizens are not merely a hegemonic carryover. These institutions take on a new meaning in globalizing Mumbai. They become necessary tools for slum dwellers to realize their right to the city. Beyond strategic considerations, it is only with such institutions in place that slum dwellers can hope to become more than slum dwellers. The payoff of living in a flat is not merely to have running water; it is also to overcome the predetermination of their existence as slum dwellers and possibly achieve real social mobility in the city. The struggle may be singular, but it is possible that slum dwellers constitute the most likely social position in the globalizing city to reject “telescopic” and particularistic urbanisms in favor of an urbanism that is expansive and aspirational.
Methodological Appendix: Trappings and Tracings

Our examination of the infrastructures of citizenship began with a question: how is political action enabled or constrained by the built environment? The conversation that sparked this inquiry began as a comparison of political organizing strategies and techniques in the United States and the ways in which the physical geography and transit infrastructure of Mumbai constrained tactics that are commonly taken for granted in the United States.

A principal reference point for this discussion was Michael McQuarrie’s personal experience as a community organizer in the South Bronx. So one of the initial, informal research exercises of our project took place there, a walk through a diverse collection of built environments and social conditions that informed subsequent research trips. One of the key themes that emerged from this journey through the South Bronx concerns the history of American ideas for how society should address poverty and how such ideas manifest themselves in the built environment. Put simply, different eras have variously emphasized services, power, or resources, and the distinct typologies of low-income housing reflect those different emphases.

Our collaboration set out to explore that idea in the context of citizenship, a concept vexed in urban studies by normative, hierarchical, electoral, or transnational political definitions and debates. Our goal was to advance and critique the contemporary literature on citizenship by moving away from discussion of a familiar but limited cluster of terms: rights, duties, and practices. We wanted to assert the importance of physical materiality and the uses of space to this discourse. Thus an interrogative emphasis emerged: how do hard and soft infrastructures enable and constrain the ability of the city’s users and residents to become civic actors?

The first attempt at this exploration took place in Berlin. We visited a range of well-studied sites in Kreuzberg and Neukölln — two neighborhoods struggling with the ramifications of rising property values, displacement, socioeconomic and ethnic interaction and perception, and the new political alignments that have emerged from these conditions. We looked for physical traces of these limits and possibilities at the widest possible range of scales, from the scale of the metropolitan system — such as networks of transit or public spaces — to the scale of the artifact — the advocacy pamphlet, graffiti, and even the tote bag. This research yielded a collection of sociological observations and photographic documentation of objects, spaces, and their uses.

This focus on objects, on what we call the trappings and tracings of citizenship,
bears a methodological bias toward visual representation and a conceptual bias toward sites that evince conflict and copresence. Therefore, our insights about how citizenship is constituted physically in Kreuzberg and Neukölln privileged markers of neighborhood myth creation, communal identity, and spatial membership. In our interviews with representatives of a wide range of institutions — primarily immigrant and minority advocacy groups — a recurring theme concerned a peculiar relationship between these institutions and the state. Most interviewees attempted to mask the extent to which the state is directly intervening in or enabling much of the work in Berlin around ideas of community and political participation.

Our next collaborative research trip took us to Mumbai. Our project began with a comparative framework, but its first scholarly product deals with a single site, Golibar, the largest slum redevelopment scheme in Mumbai. As the project has evolved, its core emphasis has remained: to reenchant the city as a landscape of possibility, as a physical space that simultaneously provokes individuals’ instinctive as well as affective reactions and arranges the possibilities for civic action in particular ways. To that end, we focused on some traditional avenues of scholarly inquiry: conflict, poverty, political practice. But we sought to recontextualize these in new ways. The case of Golibar, described in our essay, provokes difficult questions about how certain forms of citizenship practice resist the tendency to distinguish and compartmentalize the politics of the urban form.

Golibar stimulates such questions because of its territorial and economic position on the edge of globalized urbanism and the ways in which new urban subjectivities — irreducible to communal attachments or socioeconomic conditions alone — are constructed within it. Thus careful analysis of this case argues for a more holistic reading of the urban, wherein cities are landscapes of political possibility where unique constellations of institutions, laws, and built environments present opportunities for, and perhaps even infrastructures of, citizenship.
References


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